Uncertainty is an epistemological concept in the sense that any meaningful understanding of uncertainty requires a theory of knowledge. Therefore, uncertainty resulting from scientific endeavors can only be properly understood in the context of a well-defined philosophy of science. Our main message here is that much of the discussion about uncertainty in hydrology has lacked grounding in these foundational concepts, and has resulted in a controversy that is largely the product of logical errors rather than true (axiomatic) disagreement. As an example, we explore the current debate about the appropriate role of probability theory for hydrological uncertainty quantification. Our main messages are: (1) apparent (and/or claimed) limitations of probability theory are not actually consequences of that theory, but rather of deeper underlying epistemological (and ontological) issues; (2) questions about the appropriateness of probability theory are only meaningful if posed as questions about our preferred philosophy of science; and (3) questions about uncertainty may often be better posed as questions about available information and information use efficiency. Our purpose here is to discuss how hydrologists might ask more meaningful questions about uncertainty.
There is an ongoing discussion in hydrology about the role (e.g. Pappenberger and Beven 2006, Sivapalan 2009 ), nature (e.g. Montanari 2007 , Koutsoyiannis 2010 , and appropriate handling (e.g. Mantovan and Todini 2006 , Stedinger et al. 2008 , Vrugt et al. 2009 of uncertainty. For example, Montanari (2007) argued that "the topic of uncertainty assessment in hydrology suffers today from the lack of a coherent terminology and a systematic approach."
However, to properly address this issue, one should start with the fact that uncertainty is best understood as a concept derived from reason (Lindley 2006, Chapter 2) , which itself requires both a definition of and method for obtaining knowledge. We propose that the lack of coherent terminology and the general disagreement about appropriate methodologies for uncertainty quantification in hydrological applications are at least in part due to the fact that the related discussions have largely failed to be explicit about epistemological axioms. Without such a level of clarity, it is not possible to determine which aspects of this discussion derive from differences in our foundational assumptions, or as the result of one or more logical errors. While axiomatic differences are interesting, and can be fertile ground for potentially important scientific exploration, errors in logic cannot be expected to lead to new insights.
Further, if we are not explicit about our foundational axioms, it becomes difficult to differentiate fundamental sources of uncertainty (and the consequences of such) from uncertainty that might be mitigated through improved practice and methodology. To address this problem, we propose here that the organizing principle behind uncertainty quantification should actually be the following question: "How much information do we have, and how well do we use it?" When the problem is posed in this way, we are able to clearly delineate fundamental from practical limitations to our ability to improve our knowledge of hydrological systems-and, indeed, probably all natural systems.
This essay provides an example of the type of discussion that we hope to promote. In particular, we outline the basic epistemological concepts that are necessary to rigorously evaluate the current debate about the appropriate role of probability theory for quantification of hydrological uncertainty (see Beven 2015 and references therein) . That is, we describe the axioms from which probability theory is derived as a philosophy of science. In doing so, we discover that, at least in some notable cases, certain disagreements in our literature can be explained as the consequences of logical errors. We further argue that the way that uncertainty is often discussed in hydrology literature is often unnecessarily confusing. Our intent is that this exercise will bring clarity to CONTACT Grey S. Nearing grey.s.nearing@nasa.gov the discussion, and will also highlight a basic strategy for making future progress. Through the course of this discussion we will arrive at several specific conclusions, of which we hope the reader will take special notice. These are as follows:
(1) There are three fundamental issues that preclude perfect uncertainty accounting: (i) the fact that we can only conduct a limited number of experiments (a finite experiments problem), (ii) the fact that we can test only a limited number of hypotheses (a finite hypotheses problem), and (iii) the fact that we can only test collections of hypotheses rather than individual hypotheses (the Duhem-Quine problem). These issues are all due to the finite nature of our own existence, and therefore logically precede any choice of epistemology. In this sense, they are fundamental problems that cannot be solved by building better inference strategies. We should recognize when we are attacking these issues (as opposed to practical issues that may, in principle, admit solutions), and we should be wary of judging the efficacy of various epistemologies, theories, or quantitative methodologies based on their (in)ability to resolve these three problems. (2) Probability theory is the unambiguous result of certain common epistemological axioms. So while there is, absolutely, room to question whether probability theory is an appropriate choice of quantitative theory for understanding and accounting for uncertainty (this discussion is quite active in the broader scientific community), the choices that we might make that lead to alternative theories are relatively well understood. None of the discussion that currently exists in the hydrology literature about the appropriate role of probability theory correctly identifies or investigates these choices. We cannot have a coherent discussion about the appropriate role of any theory without being explicit about the assumptions that theory is based on. (3) The most straightforward scientific method that supports probability theory does not allow for any meaningful concept of model error during scientific inference. This is because any hypothesis that is tested using probability theory must be, in reality, either true or false, and any model that results in non-zero error is false (i.e. we are left with a strictly Popperian science that is not useful for practical purposes). This means that any conceptualization of a "residual-based" likelihood function for use in Bayesian model inference is incorrect. There cannot be any such thing as a residual-based likelihood function because that idea is internally contradictory-it contradicts itself. While we can certainly derive information from model residuals, and while we can certainly place probability distributions over model error, we cannot use the latter type of probability distributions to perform inference or to test models. Instead, we must recognize that the models themselves must be probabilistic in order to remain un-falsified. As we will show, this means that the typical questions about choosing appropriate likelihoods are really about choosing appropriate priors. (4) The conclusion (3) above is true even if we were to recognize a concept of observation uncertainty because our uncertainty about any physical measurement process must itself be modeled. We are restricted to testing full models of the entire experimental process, and cannot experimentally separate observation uncertainty from other sources of model uncertainty. We can, however, ask coherent (and answerable) questions about the relative contributions of observation information and model information. This is because a posteriori uncertainty partitioning is a well-specified problem in information space, but not in probability space. (5) Finally, we discuss how an axiomatic understanding of uncertainty allows us to develop a more robust vocabulary and taxonomy for communicating ideas about uncertainty. We identify rather important ambiguities in some of the several (often conflicting) taxonomies of uncertainty in the science, engineering, and hydrology literatures, and we claim that adopting a taxonomy based on explicit epistemological axioms will facilitate less ambiguous discussion both within the scientific community and during science arbitration.
As we proceed, please keep in mind that the epistemology that we describe here is just one of many. We do not even necessarily advocate this particular epistemology (or its derived taxonomy), but we do strongly advocate a need for clarity in our literature about the fundamental nature of uncertainty. We expect that a great majority of the community-wide disagreements about uncertainty quantification could be reduced to logical errors rather than to axiomatic differences; however, we cannot know this as long as authors (continue to) fail to derive theories of uncertainty from explicit epistemological axioms. The purpose of this paper is to encourage and facilitate clarity of discussion, which will inevitably lead to more meaningful questions and improved practice.
A common epistemology

Knowledge
Our first step in building an epistemology is to define what we mean by knowledge. We cannot pretend to do this rigorously; however, let us take as our basis what is perhaps the most common system of logic: that which is based on the three axioms that Russell (1912) -arguably incorrectly (e.g. Kosko 1990, Bueno and Colyvan 2004) -described as "selfevident": (i) the law of identity ("Whatever is, is"), (ii) the law of non-contradiction ("Nothing can both be and not be"), and (iii) the law of excluded middle ("Everything must either be or not be"). We refer to any proposition that satisfies these three criteria as Aristotelian, in reference to his formalization of (ii) and (iii). Under these axioms every well-formed statement is either exclusively true or exclusively false. These axioms imply an algebra that is, somewhat confusingly, called the propositional calculus.
1 This algebra is based primarily around the modus ponens, P ! Q ð Þ^P ð Þ!Q, and modus tollens, P ! Q ð Þ^,Q ð Þ ! ,P (see Jaynes 2003, p. 4) . 2 In this context, knowledge shall be defined as our ability to distinguish the truth-value of a given Aristotelian proposition.
Inductive inference
To understand the motivation of science, we must first recognize that there is-apparently (Davies 1990 )-some regularity in relationships between events or phenomena in the universe, or at least between certain aspects of our phenomenological experience (Hume 1748) . In pursuing science, we are interested primarily in finding the truth-value of statements about this perceived regularity-such statements are called explanantia (singular: explanans) (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) 3 -using knowledge about specific events or phenomena that derive from this regularity. Leaving aside the question of the sense in which sensory experience allows us to acquire knowledge (e.g. Berkeley 1710), it impossible to proceed analytically from phenomenological knowledge to knowledge about the regularity of the universe using only the propositional algebra. This is because the modus tollens can only falsify hypotheses. To state this clearly, model evaluation cannot be a deductive process unless we use a purely falsification-based science (Neyman 1957) .
Thus, we are required to employ an additional rule where the consequent does not follow from the antecedent:
operator may be read as "weakly implies" and we must accommodate such a notion in our epistemology. We do this by recognizing a concept of belief or plausibility, and although the precise nature of this concept is widely debated (Howson and Urbach 1989) , the most important property of a useful concept of belief is that it is subject to change. In the propositional algebra, our state of knowledge might changefrom no knowledge to perfect knowledge-but if applied correctly, the propositional algebra does not allow us to ever change the value of our knowledge-i.e. from knowledge that a proposition is true to knowledge that it is false or vice versa. Belief, on the other hand, responds dynamically to our interactions with the universe.
Information
Now that we have a dynamic concept of knowledge (called belief), we recognize information as the property of a signal that effects a change in our state of belief about some hypothesis (e.g. Schement and Ruben 1993, p. 8) . This concept of information results from our axioms, rather than being prescribed to them.
Probability
Further, if we want a quantitative description of our dynamic learning process, then we need a calculus-that is, we need a mathematics of change. It turns out that probability theory is the only calculus that is consistent with the propositional algebra when belief is defined such that it can be measured by a scalar (Van Horn 2003) . Richard Cox (1946) provided at least the essential groundwork for the uniqueness proof. The strong implication here is that if we wish to deal with epistemological questions about the appropriateness of probability theory (e.g. Beven 2015) we must recognize that the probability calculus is a valid quantitative epistemology in this well-defined context. Questions about the validity of probability theory challenge either the classic propositional algebra (i.e. the concept of belief that is coherent with that algebra), or the fact that we wish to measure belief with a scalar. If claims about the efficacy of probability theory do not show fault with any of these particular axioms, then such claims are essentially uninformative.
There are several quite interesting and important discussions about the validity of the above axioms that lead uniquely (again, via Cox's theorem) to probability theory; for example Kosko (1990) offers an especially robust and provocative example of what a calculus of belief would look like without the law of non-contradiction. We can certainly imagine other contexts in which Cox's theorem is not relevant (i.e. where the axioms of that theorem are not satisfied), but the question is in what sense such contexts are either meaningful or useful. Jaynes (2003, p. 23) argued that any approach that we might take to scientific inference should be consistent with the two strong Aristotelian syllogisms (modus tollens and modus ponens) in any case where the latter are applicable; but certainly this is highly contentious (e.g. Shafer 1976 , Kosko 1990 , Dubois and Prade 2001 , Jaynes 2003 Appendix A). So, while the choice of epistemological axioms is absolutely an important conversation to have, questions and experiments aimed at understanding the appropriate role of probability theory for hydrological uncertainty quantification , Beven 2015 are only meaningful if they are directed against one or more of these axioms.
Uncertainty
So, while we may certainly question our epistemological axioms, the focus in the rest of this article is on what it means to have uncertainty in the context of the above
1
The classical propositional calculus is probably better described as an algebra, not a calculus. We will hereafter refer to this as the propositional algebra to distinguish the fact that the probability calculus is a direct extension of the propositional algebra to include a variable (a measure of belief) that is capable of dynamic response to relationships with other variables.
2
In the propositional algebra, modus ponens and modus tollens describe rules of inference. The notation P ! Q states that proposition P implies proposition Q; modus ponens states that if proposition P is true, and given the relationship between P and Q, that proposition Q is also true. By contrast, modus tollens states that, given the implication of Q from P, if Q is false then P is false. Modus tollens is the logical description of falsification.
epistemology, which is a rather standard way to ground and interpret the scientific method. In this context, uncertainty is due wholly to the fact that we must rely on non-deductive reasoning. So in this context, uncertainty is the difference between the (unknown) actual truth-value of some Aristotelian proposition and our state of belief about that truth-value.
It is important to understand that there is always, in principle, an objectively correct estimate of uncertainty in any given inference situation. While uncertainty is certainly related to our own beliefs and states of knowledge, whatever information we have available to us can either be processed correctly or incorrectly-where correctness is defined according to our epistemology, which in this case means the theorems of the probability calculus. If we violate a theorem of the probability calculus, then we are (almost always) violating one or more of the axioms of the Classical (Aristotelian) logic. Under the above epistemology, our goal should always be to use all of the available information, and to do so in a way that is coherent with our axioms. Because this is a binary proposition (either our processing of available information is coherent with the propositional algebra or it isn't), we can recognize the two fundamental issues: (i) the total amount of available information that we have available to us vs (ii) our ability to correctly process and account for that information. This motivates the question expressed in the introduction: "How much information do we have, and how well do we use it?" We suggest that this should be the basic guiding principle for all uncertainty quantification efforts in all of science, under any epistemology. This is explored further in Section 4.
Models
To have a clear picture of scientific uncertainty, we must recognize some foundational concepts related to scientific realism. Cartwright's (1983) simulacrum account of the relationship between the scientist and the apparent regularity of the universe recognizes a distinction between fundamental laws and phenomenological laws, where fundamental laws are essentially explanatory in nature and phenomenological laws are predictive. 4 This distinction centers on the idea that "fundamental equations are meant to explain, and paradoxically enough the cost of explanatory power is descriptive adequacy" so that "fundamental equations do not govern objects in reality; they govern only objects in models." The explicit consequence of this is that because fundamental laws do not actually describe anything they are not truth-apt. Thus, phenomenological laws that connect explanatory ideas with predictions of events are the primary objects of scientific inquiry under any epistemology that admits a concept of truth-aptness.
The simulacrum account works well in hydrology. Phenomenological laws are essentially what hydrologists call parameterizations (e.g. Gupta and Nearing 2014) . One or more phenomenological laws constitute a model, and even very simple models have a compendium of embedded assumptions, at the very least about how fundamental laws relate to actual entities in the models (i.e. Cartwright's bridge principles), and also assumptions about how the system under study relates to the rest of the universe. This problem is compounded for reductionist accounts of complex systems with multiple interacting components. We must therefore recognize that since all models contain multiple explanantia (all of which must be treated as hypothetical), there is no alternative to using hydrological models as working hypotheses (e.g. Clark et al. 2011 ).
Sources of uncertainty
Fundamental sources
As is often the case, if we want to control something-in this case uncertainty-then we should seek to understand the causes of that thing. There are really two ways in which we might make improvements in our ability to measure and mitigate uncertainty: we may work to either (i) reduce the effects of the fundamental causes of uncertainty, or (ii) reduce the effects of assumptions and approximations in our uncertainty quantification algorithms. In this section we explore the causes of uncertainty in the context of the epistemology outlined above; however, we argue strongly that these causes are actually more fundamental than that epistemology. We must have the epistemology to define uncertainty-that is, to make it a coherent concept-but the relationship between any epistemology and its derived concept of uncertainty is mediated by a more fundamental aspect of the relationship between scientists and the observable universe-namely to the necessarily finite nature of our own existence.
The finite experiments problem
The first fundamental problem that gives rise to uncertainty is our ability to conduct only limited sets of experiments. This means that general hypotheses can be falsified but never proven (Neyman 1957) . In other words, it is impossible to determine with certainty the truth-value of the most important hypotheses-those that are both true and general (Howson and Urbach 1989 provide a great discussion). It is always, in principle, possible to propose an infinite number of different models that allow us to correctly predict any finite number of events, and so any set of experiments that we might actually conduct will not provide the information necessary to differentiate between members of some large class of un-falsified models. This means that there will always be some fundamental uncertainty about appropriate models, and to the extent that these un-falsified models have conflicting implications about unobserved events we also have uncertainty about unobserved phenomena.
The finite hypotheses problem
A second fundamental source of uncertainty is our ability to test only a finite number of models. To understand this, suppose that there exists some concept of all possible models that we might propose as potential descriptions of processes that predict the outcomes of a particular set of experiments. For example, we might interpret the Church-Turing 5 thesis (for a formal treatment, see Hutter 2003, p. 34) as implying that all possible models can be expressed as programs for a universal Turing machine (e.g. Rathmanner and Hutter 2011, p. 42) . It is then possible to place an explicit prior over this complete set (Solomonoff 1964) . To test each hypothetical model we must use it to make predictions, which will require at least a finite amount of effort (Rathmanner and Hutter 2011, Section 9.1). Given finite resources, it is therefore only possible to test a finite sample of the infinite number of possible models.
Uncertainty arises here from the fact that the act of not testing some potentially correct model is indistinguishable from assigning to that model zero probability in the inference prior (here the inference prior is formally a Bayesian prior since we are working under the probability calculus). This means that the probability assigned to that model in our inference posterior will also be zero, which is a mistake. First, notice that we run the risk of excluding a true model from the support of our prior by assigning a probability p = 0 to a true model (this essentially always happens in hydrology since none of our models can be expected to be true in the Aristotelian sense discussed above). This is a special case of the more general mistake where the hypothetical posterior probability that would be assigned by Jaynes' robot (a hypothetical machine capable of perfect probabilistic inference) to some excluded model might be positive, and therefore assigning to that model a prior probability of zero as a matter of convenience results in an incorrect state of belief after performing scientific inference even if that model is false.
The Duhem-Quine problem
The Duhem-Quine thesis (Harding 1976 ) is the classical statement of the fact that any type of inductive reasoning is restricted to acting on models that are necessarily built from a compendium of hypothetical explanantia (this predates Cartwright but is supported by her arguments 6 ). This is especially-but under the simulacrum account certainly not uniquely-important in the context of complex systems (Weinberg and Weinberg 1988) such as watersheds (Dooge 1986 ) where many physical processes interact at different temporal and spatial scales. This makes it impossible to test individual explanantia, which is a problem when we are looking to discover generalities because all models require (hypothetical) specific explanantia to connect (hypothetical) general explanantia with the details of a particular set of experiments. If we can only test models that predict integrated responses of complex systems, then we cannot directly test hypotheses about the components of those systems, and we cannot arrive at generalities (Clark et al. 2011) .
Proximal sources
In hydrology, uncertainty is often conceptualized as deriving from a few primary sources: often from model parameters, measurements of boundary conditions, model structures, and observations used for model evaluation/inference (e.g. Liu and Gupta 2007, Beven and Smith 2014) . This idea derives from conceptualizations of classes of open systems that share partial description by a common set of explanantia. We generally refer to an encoding of any set of shared explanantia as a model structure (e.g. Gupta and Nearing 2014) . There are, however, differences between each different system within this larger class, and these differences are described by a different set of typically more or less welldefined explanantia, which we often call model parameters, that serve to describe variation between individual systems. Further, since there are no static or isolated subsystems in the known universe, prediction always requires boundary conditions. Finally, in order to perform scientific inference, we require some observational data about whatever state of the system our model predicts.
Model uncertainty
So, in what sense does each of these things contribute to uncertainty? First, it is those explanantia-based components -structures and parameters-that we are interested in performing inference over because those are the descriptions of the fundamental regularity of our dynamic systems. As such, we have uncertainty about model structures and parameters exactly because of the three fundamental reasons listed in Section 3.1 (finite experiments, finite hypotheses, and Duhem-Quine problem). In addition, however, models must themselves be uncertain. This is necessary since all hypothetical sets of explanantia must be truth-apt in the Aristotelian sense, and any model that is over-precise (e.g. any deterministic model) will be falsified by any conceivable experiment. We must therefore recognize that under an epistemology that affords probabilistic inference, all models must be probabilistic, and also that due to the three fundamental sources of uncertainty, even perfect probabilistic inference will result in posterior distributions over both model structures and model parameters that are not the Dirac delta distribution. We will discuss this further in Section 4.
5
The Church-Turing thesis states "everything that can reasonably be said to be computable by a human using a fixed procedure can be computed by a Turing machine." Rathmanner and Hutter (2011) , among many others, interpret this to mean that "this class of computable functions or problems is actually large enough to include any environment or problem encountered in science" since "[a]t a fundamental level every particle interaction can be computed by laws that can be calculated and hence the outcome of any larger system is computable." It is important to remember neither the formal statement of the thesis nor the purported implication for natural science are proven; however, even if there is some larger class of functions (other than Turing-computable ones) that end up being necessary to describe the physics of the universe, we are still left-provably-with uncertainty due to the finite hypotheses problem, since this problem exists even if we restrict ourselves to Turing-computable models.
Observation uncertainty
With regard to the observational components of the scientific method, we should not think of any observations (of boundary conditions or of evaluation states) as themselves containing either error or uncertainty. This may sound preposterous, but becomes clear when we understand and acknowledge that there is no such thing as "error" or "uncertainty" in a measurement device or in the readout of any such device. All measurement devices obey the laws of physics, which, if we subscribe to some form of correspondence theory (David 2015) , defines truth (explanantia are true if and only if they describe the real world). Accordingly, any "error" that arises is actually in the way that we relate the numerical output from a measurement device with the underlying physical state of the system that we are attempting to measure. So, this "error" is either due to model uncertainty-that is to a combination of (i) uncertainty in (all of) our hypothetical measurement models, and (ii) posterior uncertainty about the appropriate (probabilistic) measurement model-or it is due to the fact that our measurements of the boundary conditions lack full specifying information about the evaluation observations. Notice that the latter does not imply that our measurements are drawn from some distribution, but only that any attempt that we can make to predict these measurements must be distributional. What this means is that, while perhaps a useful conceptual tool in some cases (for example, when a theorist is handed a dataset generated by an experimentalist and has no way or desire to build and/or test models of the experimental apparatus), strictly speaking, the concepts of observation error and observation uncertainty are examples of mind projection fallacies (Jaynes 2003, p. 22) .
7 This distinction will be revisited in Sections 5 and 6.
Disinformation
The Duhem-Quine problem gives rise to disinformation. Beven and Westerberg (2011) spoke primarily about disinformation in data; however there really is no such thing-data are what they are, and the job of a scientist is to explain them. However, as those same authors pointed out, disinformation can be introduced during an inference process by projecting information from a particular dataset through an incorrect explanans and onto another explanans. As an example, consider a situation where we want to infer some description of the effective porosity of the unsaturated zone in a watershed based on some data related to discharge, but when doing so we convert stage measurements to discharge using an incorrect rating curve. In this example, disinformation (here about various effective porosity explanantia, which are likely a component of some phenomenological law that relates precipitation with infiltration) is introduced because information from stage data is corrupted by an incorrect explanantia about the relationship between stage and discharge as it is projected onto our beliefs about effective watershed-scale porosity. This holds even in extreme cases such as where a bit is flipped during electronic transmission of some observation data. Even in this extreme case, disinformation is introduced during inference strictly because of another explanans in the same model-specifically, the incorrect (albeit implicit) assumption that we have a noiseless communication channel. According to the simulacrum account, disinformation is fundamental and unavoidable. For a more practical and quantitative discussion of the relationship between disinformation and probabilistic inference, see Nearing and Gupta (2015) , and note that a very similar type of information corruption can occur due to errors in our inference procedure itself (Nearing et al. 2013) .
Likelihood
We don't choose likelihoods, we choose priors
Because the probability calculus derives from an Aristotelian epistemology, it is only possible to apply probability measures to statements that can in principle be associated with a (generally unknown) Boolean truth-value. Given only a small number of observations, almost any deterministic model of a complex system will be falsified by the modus tollens, i.e.
P ! Q ð Þ^,Q ð Þ ! ,P (see Section 2). Therefore, because of the finite hypotheses problem, it is not interesting to perform inference directly on deterministic models (Weijs et al. 2010 ). If we are not comfortable assuming that it is possible in theory (not in practice) to build a true model, then we will need to use some generalization of probability theory that does not operate on Aristotelian propositions (e.g. Kosko 1990 ).
In practice hydrological models are built as deterministic approximations of physics equations, and since we know that these models are essentially certainly wrong, standard practice is to introduce a concept of model error by placing ad hoc probability distributions around the predictions made by such models (e.g. Sorooshian et al. 1983) . Many authors (present company included) have used such distributions as the likelihood functions required by Bayes' theorem (e.g. Gupta et al. 1998 , McMillan and Clark 2009 , Harrison et al. 2012 , Nearing 2014 . Strictly speaking, however, it is an error to assign a probability of anything other than p = 0 to a falsified model (i.e. one that has any non-zero error), and when we use error distributions as likelihood functions we can then only use Bayes' theorem to assign probabilities to specific propositions about the error of such models, we cannot assign probabilities to the models themselves.
To make this more concrete, the posterior of Bayes' law as applied to an inference problem will look like pðM ¼ mjD ¼ dÞ where M is a random variable over some class of (deterministic) models, and D = d is some available data. In this case, what is the proposition m? Certainly m cannot be a proposition such as "model m is true", since if (deterministic) model m has any non-zero error then it is false. Similarly, consider the predictive distribution pðE ¼ ejM ¼ mÞ where E 7 Jaynes describes it thus: "Common language-or, at least, the English language-has an almost universal tendency to disguise epistemological statements by putting them into a grammatical form which suggests to the unwary an ontological statement. A major source of error in current probability theory arises from an unthinking failure to perceive this. To interpret the first kind of statement in the ontological sense is to assert that one's own private thoughts and sensations are realities existing externally in Nature. We call this the 'mind projection fallacy'. . ." is a random variable over "errors" or "residuals" defined as differences between model predictions and experimental observations. Here random variables such as E = e refer to Aristotelian propositions such as "our prediction of a particular phenomenon will differ by amount e as compared to a (hypothetical or actual) observation." In this case the random variable M = m simply refers to the proposition "we use model m" so that expressions such as E ¼ ejM ¼ m are read as "given that we use model m, the error will be amount e." But this does not help us at all during inference; if we define things this way we are fundamentally unable to project any information from statements such as E = e back onto expressions such as M = m. So the pertinent question is about exactly what propositions variables such as M = m refer to.
One way to address this is to treat so-called "error distributions" as components of the models that we are testing. Only by conceptualizing the situation this way-that our models themselves make probabilistic predictions-can we assign non-zero probabilities to complex models. We need to be clear that only probabilistic models can provide information in any well-defined sense (Weijs et al. 2010, Nearing and Gupta 2015) . But in this case, the resulting probabilities are associated with models that contain two types of phenomenological laws: ones that take the form of approximate consequences of Newton's laws, and ones that are purely epistemic in nature (relating to information in the model). If we want to assign probabilities to any such model, then we must perform inference over this whole model, not just over some individual component thereof; and if we choose a single error distribution (or a single likelihood function) then this is the same as restricting our inference prior to one that assigns non-zero probability only to those hypothetical models that include this one particular component-this is an example of the finite hypotheses problem. Thus we see that the debate in the hydrology literature that is ostensibly about likelihood functions is really about how to choose a degenerate prior over this particular (epistemic) component of our modelsthe debate is more correctly seen to be about choosing which models to test.
Formality
It has been charged that certain models (typically referred to as "likelihood functions") used in certain hydrology experiments are incompatible with probability theory (e.g. Mantovan and Todini 2006 , Beven et al. 2007 , Stedinger et al. 2008 , Vrugt et al. 2009 , Beven and Smith 2014 . However, any non-negative function with a finite total integral becomes a coherent probability distribution after appropriate scaling. This means, for example, that all likelihood functions used by Smith et al. (2008) are absolutely "formal" (of course, as long as we interpret them not as likelihood functions per se, but rather as components of hydrological models, for the reasons outlined above).
As an example, using a squared error objective function to define a class of models-for example p DjM prior that assigns non-zero probability only to models that themselves assign probabilities simultaneously to N experimental outcomes proportional to the inverse of the squared distance around some mean value(s) (e.g. Smith et al. 2008) . While it has been reported that such "likelihood functions" (actually models) are incoherent with the probability calculus (e.g. Mantovan and Todini 2006 , Beven et al. 2007 , Stedinger et al. 2008 , Vrugt et al. 2009 , Beven 2015 , such models do not actually violate any of the axioms of probability theory. Similarly, Stedinger et al.'s (2008) "formal" likelihood functions are equivalent to performing inference over priors that assign non-zero probability only to models that make Gaussian predictions. The latter are also "formal" if and only if we interpret them as an epistemic component of our models and not as an "error distribution" or "likelihood function." Of course, under this conceptualization the model itself is the likelihood function.
So why is it that certain models have been claimed to be incoherent or informal? Mantovan and Todini (2006) argue that certain models (e.g. Smith et al. 2008) are not consistent with the probability calculus due to the fact that different observations (notated d i , which are equivalent to Mantovan and Todini's y i ) are not independent conditional on the model M (see the section therein titled Equivalence between batch and sequential learning where they use notation θ to refer to the model). This, of course, is not a requirement of the probability calculus since any model may predict conditionally correlated events in the sense that:
A simple example is a bivariate Gaussian with ρ Þ 0 (N here denotes the bivariate Gaussian distribution with parameters μ i ; μ j ; σ i ; σ j ; ρ n o , and d i ; d j 2 R):
Inference on the parameters of this Gaussian model requires data pairs d i ; d j À Á . So, in our example from above where p DjM ð Þ/σ À2 N , we see that probabilities scale to larger datasets according to:
rather than according to:
where
is the mean of the N-variate prediction. The way to intuit this is that such models are models of single experiments that comprise N observations, not models of N repeated experiments. Mantovan and Todini correctly point out that these hydrological models predict a time series with some implicit autocorrelation (i.e. the non-equality in Equation (1) is really a non-equality). The consequence is that one cannot perform inference on such models using a time series of N Ã Þ N observations-at least not without considering the implications of the implied autocorrelation by deriving p d i;l jM; d i;l : The issue is not about the "formality" of certain models (or "likelihood functions"), but rather that we must account for the fact that the model predicts autocorrelation that must be taken into account explicitly.
To address these and related criticisms, Beven et al. (2007) claimed that "formal Bayesian identification of models is a special case" and argued that we might want to use so-called "informal likelihood functions" so as to avoid over-precise predictions. We wholeheartedly agree that it is worth making an effort to avoid overconfident models, but this should be done by choosing models that have a reduced tendency to be overconfident. In fact this is what Beven et al. (2007) actually did, although they misinterpreted their actions as generalizing a particular epistemic calculus (and, incidentally, they claimed this without actually proposing any generalization of the axioms of that calculus). Further discussion is given by Clark et al. (2012) .
In fact, there have been several-arguably (Lindley 1987 )-successful attempts to generalize Bayes' theorem (e.g. Frühwirth-Schnatter 1993); however, such attempts are meaningless unless they are supported by a generalization of the epistemological axioms that support the theorem (e.g. Kosko 1990 ). It is impossible to interpret what it means to identify a model-or even to make a prediction-without an epistemological foundation, and the difference between violating and generalizing a theorem is that the latter requires explicit statement of generalized axioms and subsequent derivation of an analogous theorem.
Taxonomy
As mentioned in the introduction, there is some ongoing effort among hydrologists to codify the concept of uncertainty into a standard taxonomy (e.g. Montanari 2007 , Beven 2015 . We here encourage the perspective that, since uncertainty is only a meaningful concept within some epistemology, any taxonomy will be largely (but not fully) dependent on the choice of epistemology.
First, let us deal with the exception to that rule. It was implied (and referenced) above that there is probably no self-evident epistemology. Beven (2015) refers to the choice of epistemology, somewhat confusingly, as ontological uncertainty, defined as "uncertainty associated with different belief systems. . . [for example,] about whether formal probability is an appropriate framework." However, in the engineering and science literature, ontological uncertainty refers to properties of the system under study, not properties of the researcher's choice of philosophy (e.g. Walker et al. 2003 , Lane and Maxfield 2005 , Brugnach et al. 2008 . It seems more straightforward to acknowledge the choice of epistemology as epistemological uncertainty, and to uncertainty about explanantia and models as ontological uncertainty. Epistemological uncertainty (but not ontological uncertainty) obviously precedes our choice of epistemology. But here we are not talking about the same type of uncertainty that occurs within a well-defined epistemology. Epistemological uncertainty is a fundamentally different thing from other types of uncertainty since uncertainty itself is only well-defined in the context of a well-defined epistemology. It is somewhat unfortunate to use the same word to describe both concepts, and this implies the obvious fact that we must have some meta-epistemology to discuss the choice of scientific epistemology (also, see Quine 1951) .
Within the context of, presumably, any epistemology that supports any empirical science, there is a fundamental distinction between explanantia and events. We therefore immediately recognize two distinct types of uncertainty: related to our ability to simulate the universe and related to our knowledge about individual phenomena that occur in the universe. We might call the former simulacrum uncertainty and the latter phenomenological uncertainty, in accordance with the language used by Cartwright (1983) .
The distinction between simulacrum and phenomenological uncertainty is not analogous to the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties defined by either Gong et al. (2013) or Beven (2015) , nor is it analogous to the distinction between contextual and phenomenological uncertainties proposed by Kreye et al. (2011) . Aleatory uncertainty is almost always defined with respect to some concept of randomness (Ang and Tang 2004 , Kiureghian and Ditlevsen 2009 , Montanari et al. 2009 , and at the scales we are concerned with in hydrology, randomness is essentially (but perhaps not completely; Bell 1964) an epistemic concept (Jaynes 2003, Chapter 10) . Thus, aleatory uncertainty is equivalent to a concept of acceptability in the opinion of the researcher (Baecher and Christian 2000, Ang and Tang 2004, Kiureghian and Ditlevsen 2009) . Similarly, and despite his best efforts, Kalman (1994) was only able to define randomness in this ultimately subjective context as "nonunique[ness] modulo all relevant regularities" (emphasis ours). If our goal were to build deterministic models (which, as argued above, should never be the objective of any applied science), we might be tempted to think of aleatory uncertainty as referring to uncertainty due to observations and epistemic uncertainty as referring to uncertainty about phenomenological laws (e.g. Gong et al. 2013) . Of course, this distinction fails under the epistemology that supports probability theory (as discussed above), and so we must recognize that epistemic and aleatory do not represent a true duality-most aleatory uncertainty at the scale of watersheds is also epistemic.
Similarly, it has been argued (Beven and Smith 2014 ) that aleatory uncertainty is due to some type of "natural random variability" and is therefore distinct from epistemic uncertainty; and, moreover, that only uncertainty arising due to these so-called natural causes (so-called "aleatory" uncertainty) is quantifiable using probability theory. Of course, this is exactly backwards: the probability calculus is an epistemological theory (as per Cox's theorem, and as outlined above) and therefore is exactly suitable for quantifying and processing our available information in a way that is consistent with the Aristotelian syllogisms. Further, it is unclear exactly what "natural random variability" might mean, except possibly related to the idea that some series of experimental outcomes may have a certain set of properties that facilitate the application of certain well-known asymptotic theorems (e.g. one experiment provides no information about another, and the entire series of experiments cannot be reproduced by any Turing machine that has shorter description length than a list; Howson 2000) . Notice, however, that this does not actually yield ontological probabilities, in that improved knowledge of the experimental conditions will always lead to reduced randomness even under these essentially frequentist conditions (Jaynes 2003, Chapter 10) . This is true to the limit of any distribution implied by a solution of Schrödinger's equation with boundary conditions at the scale of a watershed or other hydrological system, and absent such a solution, even this truly ontological probability distribution is unknown and therefore the associated uncertainty is still epistemic. No, probability theory is an epistemological calculus, and its only purpose is to quantify epistemic uncertainty.
We do agree strongly with Beven (2015) that it is necessary to recognize a concept of disinformation; however, we see this as arising from the necessarily compound nature of our models-that is, projecting information from data through incorrect model components onto uncertainty distributions over other model components. As argued above, disinformation cannot be a property of data itself, but rather is a property of our ability to decode the data. One may be tempted to conceptualize the measurement process as a (noisy) Shannon-type communication channel; however, this analogy fails because we must recognize that the universe itself is not intentional and so there is no encoder in this analogy. The information contained in our observations is not "about" anything until we decide as such, and this particular act of deciding "aboutness" is a component of our model of the physical universe-in particular, a component of our model of the measurement process. Thus, we do not recognize in our taxonomy a concept of "observation error" except as a (potentially useful but also potentially dangerous) thought experiment.
More generally, when considering any taxonomy, it is important to recognize that everyone has some a priori understanding of the central concepts (e.g. at the time of publication information is the 219th most commonly used word in the English language; www.wordcount.org). Therefore, effective science arbitration will probably require definition of all of the terms in each individual context. However, a scientist who understands the core concepts will probably be most effective at communicating their knowledge, and this is why we encourage a bottom-up taxonomy: deriving language and communication strategies from the most fundamental principles and distinctions seems the best way to avoid ambiguity.
What this all means in practice
Here we will outline several efforts to manage uncertainty in hydrology that are consistent with the epistemology outlined in Section 2, and which can be understood as directly addressing (or at least acknowledging) the fundamental limits outlined in Section 3. It is important to understand that there is no possibility that any one of these efforts will ever solve any of the fundamental problems, but it seems at least potentially valuable to be aware of the relationships between our efforts to advance the science and the true underlying challenges.
Building models vs inference
The ultimate objective of any applied science should probably be to build models directly from first principles, and since all models must account for what we do and don't know about a certain class of physical systems (as argued in Section 4), this means that we should at least desire to build uncertainty models from first principles. Notice, however, that even if we were to build models that estimated uncertainty from first principles, these models would still almost certainly be incorrect in almost all cases, and we would therefore still need to perform some form of inference (as defined above) over classes of such models. So we must make a distinction between how we build models and how we test them.
At least for the foreseeable future, hydrologists will likely continue to build and test models that include distinct uncertainty components that are estimated directly from data. That is, we will rely on past experience (i.e. frequentist accounting) to tell us what a particular model gets wrong. But it is important to remember that building models this way is very different from testing those models once they are built. We can approach these tasks in one of two ways: either by (i) estimating a model error distribution directly from data (e.g. Wilkinson et al. 2011 , Sikorska et al. 2014 and then going on to test such models using an independent data source, or (ii) by performing both steps simultaneously (e.g. Vrugt and Sadegh 2013, Brynjarsdóttir and O'Hagan 2014) .
To state this in a slightly different way, the vast majority of efforts in hydrology toward quantifying uncertainty about future predictions rely on the chain rule of probability theory (Liu and Gupta 2007) . For example, according to Sikorska et al. (2014), "[t] he problem of uncertainty assessment is in principle reducible to estimating and integrating the main sources of uncertainty through the modeling chain." But how do we know those main sources? Estimating the joint and conditional distributions necessary to apply the chain rule in this sense is precisely the purpose of the scientific method.
Combinatorial modeling systems
The primary impediment to estimating those main sources of uncertainty is due to the Duhem-Quine problem. Any error in one component of our model will result in disinformation about any other component, so it is very difficult estimate joint and conditional distributions over, or place probabilities on, each individual modeling hypothesis (each phenomenological law in our models).
One way to approach this is to use a modular modeling system (e.g. Niu et al. 2011 , Clark et al. 2015 . Such systems attempt to decompose models into their constituent phenomenological laws (or as close to such as possible). They allow the scientist to recombine various process parameterizations (different representations of various phenomenological laws) to produce many different models that include any particular hypothesized phenomenological law or parameterization. Although this does not address the finite hypotheses problem at all, it does at least explicitly acknowledge the Duhem-Quine problem by facilitating sensitivity analyses that assess the relative contributions of individual phenomenological laws to the total variability in model output. Further, by testing a combinatorial number of such models where each individual parameterization is held constant and recombined with various other parameterizations to produce different estimates of the integrated system response, it should be possible to use Bayes' theorem to infer posterior distributions over individual components in a way that is explicitly cognizant of the Duhem-Quine problem. Make no mistake: this cannot solve the DuhemQuine problem, but at least the approach addresses the problem head-on.
It is important to remember that while modular modeling systems might let us infer posterior distributions over individual phenomenological laws, they cannot do so if they do not include (hopefully many different) representations of the measurement processes related to both input and response data. And they also cannot do so unless they contain (hopefully many different) representations of the fact that no model built in such a system will have perfect process representations. That is, we still need the models to recognize their own uncertainty-such distributions must be included as a component of each model-and the choice of these uncertainty distributions should be treated as identical to the choice of any and every other model component. These are not really error distributions, but they are distributions over phenomena or events, not over phenomenological laws or parameterizations.
Information benchmarking
There also appears to be potential for using an informationcentric approach to understanding the relative contribution of various model components to predictive uncertainty. Measuring uncertainty is always an approximate endeavor because the finite hypotheses problem always requires us to use degenerate priors, and thus our estimates of measures of uncertainty are never guaranteed to converge to the values that they would have in the limit of an increasing number of observational experiments. There are, however, complete bases over certain large classes of functions (e.g. continuous functions) that allow us to estimate functional relationships directly from data (e.g. Jackson 1988 , Cybenko 1989 , and we can sometimes use these to produce estimates of information and certain measures of uncertainty that approach some true values that would result in the limit of infinite observation data (Nearing et al. 2016) . The compromise here is that this type of model benchmarking only produces integrated measures of uncertainty, not full probability distributions (Nearing and Gupta 2015) , and so this offers little help in building probabilistic models. What it does offer though is a way to quantitatively diagnose where uncertainty is coming from.
Utilitarianism
We might resolve the problem of understanding error distributions by taking a utilitarian approach. In the previous sections, we argued that distributions over model error cannot be used as likelihood functions for Bayesian inference, which is true if we want to perform inference on absolute Boolean truth-values associated with individual hydrological models. In this case, essentially all deterministic models will be falsified but more general (probabilistic) models may be assigned some non-zero probability.
In practice however, we typically recognize that even incorrect models provide useful information. In the context of the probability calculus, a likelihood ratio contains all of the information that we have about the choice between two models (Edwards 1984) , and we can integrate the ratio of predictive probabilities supplied by any two models under any transformation. The transformation under which we integrate such a ratio implies a utility function that may or may not be based on a real and meaningful concept of model error (Nearing and Gupta 2015) . In this way we may use a concept of utility to reconcile our intuition that erroneous models can provide useful information with the reality of the probability calculus.
The concept of utility allows us to perform relative inference over a limited class of models. The utility function must be well-defined and should be appropriate for a particular decision process; however, it is important to understand that any decision process is an act of will rather than an act of rationality (Neyman 1957) . The latter means that a concept of utility does not derive from any existing epistemology, and so if we desire such a concept it must be appended to the existing epistemology via the addition of one or more axioms. If we are willing to do this we can then use Bayes' theorem to assign probabilities to statements such as "this model is the best (in a particular sense) among the limited class that I am testing." Such Aristotelian statements can be (and, in fact, sometimes are) true, and so can be assigned probabilities.
But this does not solve, or even mitigate, the finite hypothesis problem because there is always the possibility that some model that is not included in our inference class would dominate in the utilitarian sense if it were considered. At best, probabilistic utilitarianism is essentially isomorphic with the interpretation of probability theory described in the preceding sections, and so there is no epistemological reason to prefer one over the other than that the former allows us to retain, in a formal sense, the familiar concept of "model error" at the expense of a more complex epistemology.
One very attractive utilitarian philosophy is based on parsimony. This concept is supported directly by the neutral ontological perspective described by Davies (1990) , who pointed out that "[t]he existence of regularities [e.g. between cause and effect] may be expressed by saying that the world is algorithmically compressible." The quantitative theory that results from this perspective is due to Kolmogorov (1963) and Solomonoff (1964) , who defined complexity rigorously in the context of the Church-Turing thesis. The complexity of data is equal to the length of the shortest program for some universal Turing machine that can output that data, plus the length of the description of the universal Turing machine. This theory has been used for hydrological model selection (Weijs et al. 2013) ; however, again in practice this only allows us to rank a finite family of models.
Summary of the main points
Our primary intent here is to show that there is a huge literature and tradition of thought that has worked to lay the groundwork for applied efforts, such as those we are currently making in hydrology, to understand what science can and cannot tell us. Despite-perhaps because of-the philosophical naiveté of the current authors (we are all trained hydrologists, not philosophers), we are convinced that much of the current debate about uncertainty in hydrology could be resolved or at least redirected in more fruitful directions if we focused on connecting practice and discussion with fundamental concepts.
So when Beven (2015) asked "whether probability theory is an appropriate framework for presenting model errors" it seems that this question can only be answered by asking a series of more basic questions:
Are we willing to suppose that hypotheses are truth-apt-that is, are hypotheses about the general principles of watershed in principle falsifiable?
Are we willing to admit a concept of belief to represent a concept of incomplete information?
Are we willing to measure belief as a scalar?
If the answers to these questions are "yes," then not only is probability theory appropriate, but it is required (Cox 1946) . So this paper really boils down a suggestion that understanding the philosophy behind concepts that we might otherwise take for granted will help us to ask better questions.
From a more practical perspective, we wish to reiterate two key messages. First, if we are indeed willing to work explicitly under some version of a falsification science, then we cannot use any concept of model error to inform distributions over observations. Instead, the model itself must produce a distribution over possible experimental outcomes. Admitting any concept of model error precludes us from assigning a probability to the model itself, and instead forces us to assign probabilities to statements about models that are interpretable only in the context of some a priori utility function. We expect that this, or some closely related perspective, will ultimately resolve the ongoing debate in hydrology about likelihood functions, which (from our perspective) is apparently vacuous. From a practical perspective, this means that we must perform inference on the whole probabilistic hydrological model, including both any approximations of physics and also a representation of the model's own missing information. We cannot presume to know what our uncertainty will look like (i.e. we cannot choose even the parametric form of a "likelihood function") independent of knowing the rest of the model. Beven (1987) identified understanding uncertainty as an emerging paradigm in hydrology, and this avenue of investigation has been (arguably) productive in the interim. Hydrology is often on the leading edge of both understanding and developing methods for applied uncertainty estimation; one of the reasons being that we deal with complex systems but mostly ones that are not chaotic, so we are able to focus our efforts on some of the foundational issues without dealing with essentially unmanageable nonlinearities. We would like to see this paradigm continue under the understanding that our methods for uncertainty about watersheds are, in fact, models in exactly the same way as our models of our knowledge about watersheds. This may be especially fruitful if we can figure out how to leverage relationships between physical information and epistemological information (e.g. Knuth 2004 ).
Epilogue
The arguments in this paper are presented in the context of strong community disagreements on the "correct" way to represent uncertainty in environmental models. Indeed, such differences of opinion have provided the motivation for writing this paper. However, we believe that it is not acceptable to simply "agree to disagree"-instead, it is critical to derive our respective positions rigorously and to understand clearly the reasons for those differences. It seems that all differences of opinion stem from either (i) differences in what we accept as axiomatic (no epistemology is free from axioms), or (ii) one or more logical errors in the derivation of theory from those axioms. Our intent here is to begin to explore the extent to which the sorts of disagreements about uncertainty that we see in hydrology stem from different starting assumptions (which can be an acceptable source of disagreement), or from errors (which is unacceptable). Starting the discussion at a place where we can understand and be explicit about our axioms is the only way to get to the bottom of any epistemological or methodological disagreements, especially ones as deeply engrained in our literature as these. We encourage the community to work with us on this project: if we end up disagreeing, let's be sure we understand exactly why.
